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 The Cost of Compliance with Biosafety Regulations in Indonesia and The 
Philippines
1 
Jose Falck-Zepeda,  Jose Yorobe, Abraham Manalo, Godfrey Ramon, 
Bahagiawati Amirsuhin, Erna M. Lokollo, Sutrisno, Supriyati, Patricia Zambrano 
The rate of development and diffusion of biotechnology innovations including 
genetically modified organisms in agriculture has increased in recent years. This is 
indirectly evidenced by the increasing area dedicated to the commercial or pre-
commercial planting of transgenic crops in several countries including the Philippines, 
Indonesia and others (James, 2005). Additionally, the benefits realized from the 
introduction of agricultural biotechnology in some countries have motivated some 
developing countries to invest in the creation of other biotechnology innovations, which 
are in the development and/or biosafety regulatory evaluation and approval stages 
(Atanassov, et al, 2004). Biosafety regulations rose from the concern of scientists and 
decision makers over the novelty and limited information available related to the 
biosafety profile of GM biotechnologies. Several countries, particularly those who signed 
and ratified the Cartagena Protocol, enacted regulations for assessing, managing and 
communicating the risk assessment and posterior decision making for Genetically 
Modified crops (Mendoza, 2005).  
One issue of concern for decision and policy makers may be that the compliance 
with biosafety regulations increases the cost and time needed for these technologies to be 
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1. However, the previous statement needs to be 
firmly set within the context of technology investments and strategic decision making. 
Common to all innovations, the R&D needed to create modern biotechnology innovations 
and its posterior deployment to farmers, is a long and costly endeavor. The seemingly 
high cost of developing and deploying GM innovations is not – and should not be- the 
only focus for the decision makers’ analysis.  Rather, the need arises to focus attention in 
contrasting (high) costs of R&D (including biosafety) with the expected level benefits 
that may accrue to farmers through the use of the technology. In essence implies 
contrasting the cost of R&D and compliance with regulations and technology transfer, to 
the benefits of adopting the technology in a (hopefully strategic) investment analysis 
framework.  
This paper is structured as follows: First we describe the current status of 
biotechnology and biosafety in both countries. Second we present the data collected for 
the cost of compliance with biosafety regulations and development in Indonesia for 
potatoes resistant to fungi/nematodes, insect resistant cotton, drought tolerant sugarcane 
and insect resistant rice bioinnovations.
2 In the Philippines we collected data on the 
delayed ripening papaya, insect resistant (Bt) maize, Golden Rice and bacterial leaf blight 
resistant (Xa21) rice. These technologies highlight cross-cutting issues that include 
different traits, crops, institutional and governance issues, and stage of technological 
development. Finally we proceed to draw a set of policy and biosafety decision making 
implications to be addressed by regulatory bodies in both countries. We expect that these 
case studies will contribute to understanding the economics of biosafety regulations and thus lead to refinements of the current functioning regulatory process in The Philippines 
and Indonesia that in turn will contribute improving further their efficiency. The ultimate 
goal of any review of a regulatory system is identifying ways to attain cost containment; 
that is, achieving an efficient and socially accepted level of biosafety while minimizing 
cost (Jaffe 2006). Across countries, this cost will depend to a large extent on the adopted 
regulatory framework which in turn varies significantly given the diverse environment, 
resources, capacities, culture, and societal concerns. 
Methodology 
Estimating the cost of compliance with biosafety regulations and total cost of 
product development will always be controversial. There are significant methodological 
questions regarding attribution of costs and use of generally accepted standard accounting 
practice in the estimation of such costs.  Issues, such as inclusion of the cost of failed 
technologies during the R&D and regulatory process to be charged to successful 
technologies sold to consumers, calculating the opportunity financial cost to society are 
also controversial; yet are standard practice in accounting.   
The most controversial aspect, however, of estimating the cost of regulation of 
GM technologies (or of any regulated technology) is determining whether a particular 
activity is a biosafety compliance cost versus a product development cost. Alternatively, 
this issue can be framed within the question of whether a specific activity is necessary (or 
sufficient) to demonstrate safety or was done to fulfill other development objectives. 
There is simply no clear cut rule that allows the analyst to identify costs into one category 
or the other, in fact there are several alternatives, which are equally controversial. Most analysts choose a set of heuristics (“rules of thumb”) that guide the process 
of determining whether a particular activity falls under regulatory compliance and thus 
assign a cost of regulation. In this sense, we choose to base our methodology partially in 
the process described by DiMasi (2003a, 2003b), those followed by the Activity Based 
Accounting methodologies used by the firm KPMG (KPMG 2000)
3 in their study to 
evaluate cost recovery of biosafety regulations in Australia, and other studies examining 
the cost of compliance with biosafety regulations (Kalatzaidonakes et al 2005, Pray, et al 
2006). The basis of these approaches is to identify activities (and element within 
activities that drive cost) first and then attach cost estimations when possible.  
The process described above is necessary particularly with changing and/or 
evolving regulatory environments, where it may be necessary to modify the way the cost 
structure is reported. Regulatory regimes, including activities requested or deemed 
necessary by the regulatory authority- may change over time. Having the flexibility and 
the ability to re-estimate regulatory and development costs is indispensable in this type of 
costing efforts with regulatory regime changes or when there is significant disagreement 
whether a particular activity is  biosafety or R&D.  
We thus followed a three step procedure: 1) Identify all the activities done during 
the product development process including the R&D, regulatory and technology transfer 
stages
4, 2) Establish the set of biosafety activities explicitly required by biosafety laws, 
regulations and guidelines, 3) Establish a set of biosafety activities not included in step 
two but that may have been required (through formal or informal communications by the Regulatory body in charge of the biosafety assessment process), 4) Assess expert and/or 
stakeholder opinion of what category a particular technology fall into. 
We used a very simple set of heuristics: 1) Activities included in steps two and 
three that have been identified from step one may be counted as regulatory activities, 2) 
Activities identified in step four as regulatory, but that are not in Steps two or three, will 
not be considered as regulatory.  
Note that the process (and heuristics) described above do not answer the question 
of whether a particular activity is actually needed to demonstrate safety of a particular 
technology. To take into consideration the question of whether an activity is needed to 
demonstrate safety, an alternative process is to determine what is the minimum 
information set needed to demonstrate safety versus what is required by the regulatory 
body and/or submitted by the proponent. This process calls for identification of a 
minimum information set needed to demonstrate safety, determination of attributes that 
will describe safety and the standard by which to judge achievement of safety. The 
minimum information set ideally should reflect society’s values and is agreed upon 
accepted process by society.  
Biosafety evaluations and approvals are typically made at the national level and 
thus the consensus build-up of the minimum information set has to be done at the 
national level. Ideally, national level efforts should be coordinated with those at the 
regional and international level to take advantage of regional and international 
efficiencies while performing biosafety assessments. There is, however, no 
internationally accepted minimum biosafety information set for food/feed and environmental safety available yet, although there are some efforts currently underway
5. 
Convergence to a biosafety decision making process involves settling on a conceptual 
framework and approaches that guides biosafety assessments. We present our results with 
the understanding that if an efficient information set is eventually identified we will be 
able to re-estimate our results promptly.  
Study Protocol    
The case studies estimating the cost of biotechnology in Indonesia and The 
Philippines were implemented using sets of common questionnaires and templates 
common to all countries where similar studies are being done, modified for the context in 
both countries.  Besides the estimation of the cost of compliance with biosafety 
regulations and R&D for the specified technologies, we also gathered data on human 
resources available for R&D and the current status of biosafety and biotechnology in both 
countries.  
Interviews were conducted team leader scientists, coordinators of the national 
regulatory committee and the respective scientific/technical committees involved with 
regulatory affairs and their supporting staff. We also reviewed all available 
documentation including executive/administrative orders, laws, regulations and other 
publicly available materials. When possible we also reviewed available written contracts 
concerning publicly and privately delivered services to the applicants, such as those for 
conducting experiments.  
The technologies chosen for this study were based on a sample from all 
technologies included in both the Next Harvest study (Atanassov, et al. 2004), other reports (Bahagiawati et al, 2003; Mulya et al, 2003) and initial discussion with scientists 
and regulators.  We strived to sample technologies that are currently in the regulatory 
evaluation process or are within a range of 3-5 years of entering the regulatory process.  
Related studies 
Table 1 presents some of the exploratory studies that have examined the agro-
biotechnology regulatory costs and processes for several commodities and countries. The 
regulatory costs varied across commodities and countries ranging from US$ 53,556 for 
Bt eggplant in India to US$ 2.25 million for viral resistant rice in Costa Rica. Whether 
these compliance costs are low or high is arbitrary and subjective unless compared to an 
appropriate benchmark of an efficient regulatory system. Falck-Zepeda (2006) lists some 
of the studies completed since then, including those in India and China (Pray, et. al, 2005; 
Pray, et. al, 2006). Table 2 disaggregates the cost by activity and by country. As a first 
step in the policy analysis process, it is better to initially understand the structure of the 
regulatory process and the costs involved before decisions on whether high regulatory 
costs have stifled biotechnology innovation can be made.  
The regulatory processes across countries also differed influencing to a large 
extent the level of costs. Some governments, for example China, have been sensitive to 
criticisms over the time taken for regulatory assessments and of the costs of regulations 
and thus have implemented revisions of the regulatory process an in some cases modified 
the process in order to attempt costs reductions. Pray, et al. (2006) presents and example 
where the process to conduct confined field trials was indeed modified in China.  The cost evaluation used in some of the studies in the literature, particularly in the 
developing countries where the regulatory framework is just evolving is more of the ex-
ante type hence, costs are derived from ‘best guess’ estimates. For the ex-post studies, the 
approach simply follows the collection of cost data for complying with the regulation. 
The later costs studies typically examine the real-resource compliance costs and do not 
include other social costs like government sector regulatory costs, social welfare losses, 
transitional and indirect costs (Falck-Zepeda, 2003). 
The cost of compliance may also vary with the type of institution undertaking the 
regulatory compliance. Pray, et al. (2005, 2006) indicated that regulatory cost incurred by 
private companies is usually higher than those by the public sector. A plausible 
explanation is that in the public sector, costs are usually underestimated due to nominal 
amounts of charges on tests and salaries and/or preferential or subsidized cost charges to 
the public sector. According to Pray, et al. (2005, 2006), in China, the cost of approval of 
a new GM field crop event between private companies and the government differed by 
about US$ 30,000 and the cost per trial for private firms is typically about three times 
more than the costs by government research institutes.  
These results available in the literature showcase the need to utilize robust, 
consistent and rigorous methodology to estimate the cost of regulations. In addition the 
methodology chosen will need to be flexible enough to accommodate a changing 
regulatory environment that may affect activities performed to demonstrate safety and/or 
to obtain regulatory approval by the appropriate regulatory agency. The technologies discussed in this paper and our estimations of the total cost of development for Indonesia 
and The Philippines can be found in Tables 3 and 4. 
Cost of Compliance with biosafety regulations in Indonesia 
Drought-Resistant Transgenic Sugarcane (PTPN XI) 
In 2003, PTPN XI registered the transgenic sugarcane to BFSC through BFSTT, 
to evaluate its phenotype and invasiveness at the containment facility in ICABIOGRAD. 
Evaluation of the stability of the transgene was simultaneously carried out in greenhouses 
and laboratories at PTPN XI. Authorization for the confined field trials were granted by 
the regulatory body in 2003, and was implemented in two locations in East Java (Jatiroto 
and Asembagus). By 2005, the total expense paid by PTPN XI to fulfill these regulatory 
requirements was IDR 178 million (Table 5). 
Transgenic Rice Resistant to Stem Borers (Indonesian Institute of Science) 
After 7 years of development, the resulting transgenic plants were subjected to a 
confined field trial in 2003. That year, the Bt-rice was also registered to get approval for 
commercial released. The approval process began with an authorization from Indonesian 
regulatory agencies for conducting confined field trial studies in West Java. The confined 
field trials were held in Sukamandi, Karawang, Pusakanegara, and Indramayu. The field 
study was carried out in 3 years to evaluate the effect of Bt toxin carried by the transgenic 
plants on non-target species, especially insect predators and soil microbes. On 2006, there 
will be more studies on gene flow from the transgenic rice (Table 6). 
Table 6 showed that up to 2004, Indonesian Institute of Science has spent IDR 
226 million (PV IDR 266 million), which equal to US $ 24,200 (PV US $ 29,000). According to Dr. Inez S. Loedin (Personal Communication), IIS would need an 
additional IDR 470 million to complete all the requirements of the approval processes 
listed in Table 6. The additional fund would be required for gene flow studies, multi-
location testing, and facilitating meetings of regulatory bodies to evaluate the collected 
data from the aforementioned studies. 
Bt-Cotton Resistant to Bollworm (Monsanto) 
Indonesia was the first country in South East Asia that approved commercial field 
releases of transgenic plants. To obtain a permit to release their Bt-cotton, the Monsanto 
had to comply with the regulatory processes by conducting evaluations and research on 
the Bt-cotton at the containment facility owned by the ICABIOGRAD. The approval for 
a limited field release at 7 districts in South Sulawesi was obtained in 2001. The total of 
direct cost spent to complete the process was approximately IDR 919 million (PV IDR 
974 million) or approximately US $ 93,000 (PV US $ 99,800), as summarized in Table 7. 
The time spent on additional research and assessments was merely 2-3 years. It took less 
than a year to attain a safe for environment status from the technical regulatory body in 
Indonesia, but it took longer to actually get the permit from the national regulatory body 
and the Minister of Agriculture. A limited permit was finally issued provide that 1) The 
permit was only valid for 1 year, 2) Bt cotton could only be planted at 7 districts in the 
province of South Sulawesi, 3) The release must be monitored by an appointed team, 4) 
Harvested seeds and other byproducts must not be used for feed nor food, 5) The permit 
would be reevaluated if some unintended negative consequences that can harm the 
environment and human health were found.  In 2001, about 6,639 farmers planted the Bt-cotton over 4,363 hectare area with 
an average yield of 1.2 tons/hectare. By 2002, the plantation area increased to 5,124 
hectares and 10,424 farmers were involved. The average yield also increased to 2.2 
tons/hectare, which was 2-3 times higher than the average yield of non-transgenic cotton 
varieties (Bermawie et al, 2003). However, Monsanto decided not to continue the 
plantation of Bt-cotton in 2003 and beyond. 
Roundup-Ready (NK603) Corn  
Monsanto started the application process for the herbicide-resistant corn in 2002. 
Originally, there were two roundup-ready corn applied for approval: RR GA21 and RR 
NK603. However, Monsanto subsequently decided to focus on RR NK603 for the 
Indonesian market. Table 8 shows that since 2002 the company has spent around IDR 81 
million (PV IDR 133 million), which equal to US $ 8,700 (PV US $ 14,000). Until this 
paper was written, a release permit has not been issued for RR NK603. It is expected that 
more research and evaluations would need to be carried out to get the approval, which 
means that around IDR 953 million or US $ 106,000 would be needed to pay for the 
whole regulatory processes. 
Cost of compliance with biosafety regulations in The Philippines 
The costs estimates up to these regulatory stages have been obtained from a series 
of interviews with PhilRice and IRRI scientists in late 2005 and early 2006. For the 
multi-location field trials and commercialization stages, the costs were derived from 
interviews with the regulators. Since there has been no experience from these regulatory stages for rice, the estimates are conservative and drawn practically from their 
experiences in the commercialization of Bt corn and RR corn.  
Golden Rice 
Golden Rice is a product of genetic engineering where a daffodil or maize gene 
was introduced into the traditional rice seeds to produce a yellow orange rice that 
contains beta-carotene. The name is coined from the yellow color of the grain which 
results from the introduction of the daffodil or maize gene. The technology was 
developed by scientists at the University of Freiberg using the donation of intellectual 
property licenses from a number of private companies (Barry, 2005). In October 2004, 
Syngenta donated to the Rice Humanitarian Board in Switzerland new Golden Rice seeds 
and lines for research and development. The Syngenta Golden Rice 1 (SGR1) was first 
received in the Philippines in December 2004. Through backcrossing, the Golden Rice 
genes have been introgressed into popular rice varieties in the Philippines
6 at IRRI. More 
recently, a new strain of Golden Rice called SGR2 containing significantly higher levels 
of beta-carotene than SGR,1 has been developed (Alfonso, 2004). Due to the high 
prevalence of Vitamin A deficiency (VAD) in children, pregnant and lactating women, 
there is now a growing interest to commercialize Golden Rice in the Philippines. This 
technology is still under evaluation in screen houses at IRRI and PhilRice to produce 
stable lines. 
The regulation for the Golden Rice was more of a ‘learning by doing’ approach as 
the event has not yet been approved in any country and the regulation itself was just 
evolving in the country. However, regular consultations with all the stakeholders were also undertaken by the regulators in establishing the necessary protocol to meet a 
satisfactory biosafety level. Table 9 presents the estimated cost of regulatory compliance 
to date for the Golden Rice event is US$ 134,456 (US$104,698). The laboratory and 
screen house evaluation costs were the actual costs incurred as the GMO is presently in 
this regulatory stage at the CL4 facility at IRRI and CL2 facility at PhilRice. The event 
selection alone costs about US$ 2,000 per event. The cost at this stage comprised 16 
percent of the total while the confined field trial cost was estimated to be the largest (44 
%). For food safety, in our interviews regulators and scientists consulted indicated that 
data for allergenicity/toxicity tests will probably be required for this event, although a 
strong possibility exists for the regulatory body to accept data generated elsewhere.  
One interesting issue is bioavailability. There is significant disagreement amongst 
scientists and regulators whether this constitutes a product development of is a regulation 
induced activity. As we do not have any strong opinion one way or the other, we simply 
adopt a conservative stance and assume that bioavailability is part of product 
development and for now is not a cost of compliance with biosafety regulations. This 
situation will change if any regulatory body requests data on bioavailability from 
developers. Then based on our heuristics, whether it is required or not to demonstrate 
safety, we will count it as cost of compliance with biosafety regulations
7.  
There is presently no agency conducting toxicity and allergenicity studies in the 
country hence, the cost quoted here was taken from data collected in India by Pray, et al. 
(2005). The estimates from India are a somewhat inflated as the Indian regulatory 
required repeated replicates of these tests in different species and over time. However, note that if we used data from the Kalatzaidonakes et al. (2004 and 2005) study we would 
obtain much higher estimates of cost.  
The multi-location evaluation cost was estimated to be similar with the Xa21 
event given the same protocol. The major regulatory cost item at this stage is conducting 
the field trials in several sites. The risk assessment cost may be estimated as small, 
however it may increase as regulators require additional tests or information on the event, 
e.g. socio-economic impact evaluation. The commercialization costs amounts to US$ 
2,517. In both multi-location and commercialization stages, the application include the 
costs for logistics and other support services of the approving agency. The regulatory cost 
at the post-commercialization stage is minimal compared with Xa21 as only two years of 
field monitoring was considered. 
Aside from the direct costs, the large capital investment needed to comply with 
the biosafety regulation must also be taken into consideration in the design of the 
regulation. For small private companies, the significant capital outlay may provide 
disincentives to do research and produce novel transgenic products. In order to comply 
with regulations, both IRRI and PhilRice have constructed new facilities and improved 
their laboratories to meet the biosafety level required by the regulation for Xa21 and 
Golden Rice. Table 6 presents the capital investments incurred by the two institutions at 
current prices.  
The Bacterial Blight Resistant Rice (Xa21) 
Bacterial blight is one of the most destructive diseases of rice in the world causing 
as much as 20-30 percent of rice yield losses in some areas of Asia (Gueco, et. al., 2000).  As early as 1987, there was already a growing concern to develop bacterial blight 
resistance in rice and tests for new genes showing resistance have emerged. In 1990, a 
dominant gene for resistance to bacterial blight was successfully transferred to the 
cultivated variety ‘IR24’ and was designated as Xa21. This cloned gene was also used to 
transform an elite indica rice variety IR72 into transgenic rice resistant to bacterial blight  
The seed materials used to screen test bacterial blight resistance using IR72 were 
obtained from the defunct International Laboratory for Tropical Agricultural 
Biotechnology (ILTAB) in California, USA. It was given through a material transfer 
agreement without cost. The screen testing was done for two seasons of crop year 1998-
99 and it was approved for confined trial testing by NCBP in 2001. These trials were 
already conducted at PhilRice for two seasons in 2002-03 and for one season at IRRI in 
2005. After the project was started and data collected, we found out that the genetically 
modified rice resistant to bacterial blight will not be commercialized, as the new strain 
also resistant to bacterial blight has already been developed through conventional 
breeding, which implies a much cheaper development cost. Innovators will not pursue 
further development of the genetically modified Xa21 event. We present our estimations 
for the bacterial blight rice to provide information for future development of rice 
innovations in The Philippines. 
Table 10 shows the cost of compliance with biosafety regulations for the Xa21 
rice. The total cost of regulation of the Xa21 rice is about US$ 127,577 current values 
and US$99,213 (at 2000 constant prices) with the laboratory and screen house 
evaluations accounting for 19 percent of the total cost. This activity was started in 1998-99 with the agro-morphological and laboratory evaluation at PhilRice. The main cost 
items at this stage are the laboratory costs for the molecular analysis (to include PCR, and 
Southern Blot tests) and personal services.  
Insect resistant (Bt) Maize 
Table 11 present estimates on the insect resistant maize using the Bt gene 
(MON810) developed by Monsanto. One major problem the researchers faced in 
developing the Bt corn cost structure was how to attribute the costs incurred in the United 
States – those studies and activities conducted from the gene discovery phase to the first 
set of laboratory and greenhouse experiments – to the total product development cost for 
the Philippines. These items were basically the core activities necessary to develop the Bt 
crop from a mere concept to a finished physical product, with the attendant development 
costs. Once the physical product has been realized, future activities in further technology 
development and biosafety regulation compliance were geared towards the commercial 
development of the product in those countries where Bt corn MON810 would be later 
introduced. 
An economically sound approach is to use the concept of Lindahl pricing and 
adapt it to our particular case. Adapting the principle of Lindahl price, we distribute 
proportionately the cost of producing a public good based on the share to total benefits 
derived by each entity from its utility. Thus, in our particular case, the Lindahl factor is 
used to determine that portion of the costs of the core activities conducted in the U.S. that 
will be attributed to the total cost of developing Bt corn event MON810 solely for the Philippines (Expanded discussion of the Lindahl factor and pricing can be found in 
Manalo and Ramon (2007) 
The cost of developing Bt corn event MON810 in the Philippines – from the U.S. 
laboratory testing to the post approval stewardship stage – is estimated at PhP 
127,977,169 (or US$ 2,607,793) at 2004 discounted prices. Table 11 shows the costs in 
terms of major activity groupings. Laboratory and greenhouse activities conducted in the 
U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s, mostly in the form of experiments and scientific studies, 
accounted for about 5.2 million pesos. The sum is small relative to the total cost of 
development because of the Lindahl factor that was considered in the cost attribution. 
Based on the computation, the Philippines accounts for only 0.73% of the total 
expenditures incurred for these activities. Without Lindahl pricing, the cost of the U.S.-
based activities alone would have reached PhP 712 million (or US$ 29 million).  
Laboratory and greenhouse activities conducted in the Philippines amounted to 
about 2 million pesos only. These activities simply complemented those already 
conducted in the U.S., thus the relatively small amount. The product developers also 
earned additional savings from the use of laboratory and greenhouse facilities of the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) free of charge, in the spirit of the IRRI-
UPLB cooperation.  
Costs for the single-site confined field trial (CFT) reached 7 million pesos. 
Contrasting this to the total costs of about 44.38 million pesos incurred for the conduct of 
the multi-location field trials (MFT) in 17 sites – or an average of 2.61 million pesos per 
site – the unit cost of conducting the latter experiment is cheaper by more than 60%. If we are to factor out the cost of capitalization, the unit costs of conducting each 
experiment in their respective current years is about PhP 5.15 M for CFT and PhP 2.2 M 
for MFT. Here we can appreciate the advantage of economies of scale. Conducting 
simultaneous multi-location field trials cost relatively much less per unit compared to the 
conduct of a single-site field test.  
Costs incurred for the application for commercial propagation amounted to about 
16.31 million pesos. A significant portion of this amount (close to 85% or 13.79 million 
pesos) came from the nine biosafety and socioeconomic studies outsourced to 
independent scientists and conducted in support of the commercial application. Also 
worth noting is the PhP 287 thousand government fee paid (at 2004 discount cost) for the 
permit application. Due to financial constraints, the DA follows the principle of full cost 
recovery, whereby the transaction costs involved in processing the permit application is 
passed entirely to the applicant. 
The overlapping nature between technology development on one hand and 
regulatory compliance on the other may be evident in many activities conducted in 
developing the Bt corn. When individual activities were defined as to their primary 
objective and strictly classified according to their core function, it was discovered that 
two-thirds (66.9%) of the total cost in Table 11 can be allocated to activities conducted 
largely for the purpose of compliance to government regulatory requirements. Thus the 
estimate cost of compliance with biosafety regulations in The Philippine for the MON810 
maize was roughly 1.7 million dollars over the approval period.  
Delayed Ripening Papaya Delayed ripening is a desirable trait as it prolongs the shelf life while reducing 
damage during transport. Although the Philippine is the 8
th largest producer of papayas in 
the world, its level of exports is relatively small. A major explanatory factor is the papaya 
ringspot virus and post harvest losses. Post-harvest losses in papaya production can occur 
at any point in the warehousing, marketing, and distribution channel. There are several 
factors that contribute to post-harvest losses of the highly perishable fresh papayas, from 
physical damage due to mishandling and long transport to spoilage due to occasional 
surplus in the market. However, a contributing factor to all of these and a major factor 
itself is physiological decay of the fruit due to over-ripening.  
Table 12 presents the results of our estimation of the total cost of development for 
the delayed ripening papaya. This includes research, development and regulatory costs 
grouped together. We continue the process of separating these totals into individual 
components, but more work is needed to provide dis-aggregated numbers. This 
technology is particularly exciting from a developing country perspective as a significant 
share of the R&D has been done in country. However, there have been several 
contributory (in terms of financing and capacity strengthening) agencies including 
ACIAR (Australian Centre for International Agricultural Reseach), University of 
Queensland, and Philippines Public sector organizations. This makes separating costs 
even more difficult as there are multiple sources and types of funding. 
Without discounting, the total estimated cost of developing the transgenic delayed 
ripening papaya in the Philippines amounted to US$869,432.51 or equivalently PhP39, 
964,165 in 2005 values. The stream of component costs covered the period of 1997 to 2008 – 12 years of work that started in the laboratory and will end upon gaining 
regulatory approval. Time frames overlap between laboratory phase and greenhouse 
phase since major expenses (for construction) on the latter already started by the end of 
2001. On the other hand, activities related to pre-commercial application and commercial 
application will be conducted simultaneously with the field testing. 
More than half of the total cost was expended during the 1997-2001 period under 
activities conducted in the laboratory. Percentage expenses for the succeeding phases 
taper down consistently to 22.3 (greenhouse), 16.2 (field trial), and 8.8 (pre/commercial 
application).Activities conducted during the laboratory phase accounted for 52.7% of the 
total cost at US$520,217. It was during this time when significant investments in 
equipments and human development were made, significantly contributing to the total 
cost. Activities under the pre-commercial application and commercial application consist 
mostly of those that will be done in compliance to regulatory requirements, namely 
payment of processing fees and conduct of IEC activities. A socio-economic study and a 
market feasibility plan will also be conducted in support of the application for 
commercialization. A significant component included the same item is the cost of 
converting the transgenic line into a hybrid variety. 
Discussion 
The relatively high levels of expenses needed to conduct biotechnology R&D can 
be seen in equipment investments needed to perform biotechnology R&D. For example, 
one DNA sequencer alone may cost about US$ 1 million and this is already significantly 
higher than the R&D budget of some national research organizations in developing countries. Of course this particular equipment (and others) not only needs to be 
depreciated amongst the many GM technologies to be evaluated, but also amongst other 
types of biotechnologies where this machine will be used extensively (marker assisted 
selection and other techniques). Research organizations may be able to access expensive 
equipment through leasing o renting time for using these machines in other organizations. 
This strategy has been used quite successfully in The Philippines. However, the fact 
remains that the initial investments to purchase expensive R&D equipment is a barrier to 
entry for smaller organizations and the public sector as they are sunk costs once 
investments are made.  In the end, investment costs in building, equipment and other 
capital investments should be evaluated as closely as possible in order to maximize 
society’s benefits as rigorously as possible, with the major objective of answering the 
question of whether this particular investment is needed to demonstrate safety.  
The regulatory cost estimates for the Xa21 and the Golden Rice may be low 
relative to the costs incurred by private companies that may range from US$ 100,000 to 
US$ 4 million for food and non-food crops (Pray, et. al., 2005), however the goal, 
objective and scope of private R&D is usually different. Costs estimates presented here 
are comparable with the regulatory costs of public sector produced events in China and 
Bt eggplant in India (Pray, et. al., 2006). It is however, expected that these regulatory 
costs will decline in the future as these rice technologies are approved in other countries.  
Some of the more expensive tests can be done in other countries where it is less costly, or 
information generated in one country (or within the same country) may be used in others 
to guide the biosafety assessment of the same event. In addition, the regulatory system may reduce the minimum information set by identifying activities that either does not 
contribute any more information to the determination of safety or where a specific risk 
consideration may have been identified as not contribution to the risk profile of the 
technology. Costs will generally be reduced as regulators become more experienced as 
more events pass through the regulatory process, assuming that there is no change in the 
laws and/or regulations that guide the regulatory process.  
An example of the cost changes expected as regulatory systems gain experience is 
that of the biotechnology laboratories at IRRI and PhilRice that have been approved by 
the Philippines regulatory system to undertake research on regulated materials such as 
GMOs. The CL2 and CL4 in these two institutes are low and high level containment 
facilities required for biotechnology research work. On the one hand, these investments 
may be necessary to ensure biosafety and minimize negative externalities for some crops 
and traits, these investments will need to be depreciated and its value attributed to all the 
technologies in the R&D pipeline that may make use of the contained evaluation 
facilities.  
On the other hand, although large investments needed to establish these contained 
facilities may become major constraint for a public research institution, isolation facilities 
may be rendered obsolete in the long –run as the regulatory process may deem that the 
current state of knowledge and familiarity with specific crops and/or traits eliminate the 
need for performing biosafety assessments under contained situations.  Important concept 
from a regulatory standpoint is to always establish the link between the level of regulatory effort and the level of risk that the technology candidate for release represents 
to humans and the environment.  
The costs presented here are direct costs incurred by the public institutions 
representing costs associated with technical and administrative procedures to comply 
with the biosafety regulations. Since these are public institutions, the costs may not pose 
to be a major constraint in the regulatory compliance but, more important is the speed by 
which these technologies are commercialized. 
Concluding remarks 
Innovation has and will continue to be part of the sustainable development 
process in all countries of the world. As with any aspect of human activity, the use of 
innovations implies a certain amount of risk. Pursuing technologies with zero risk is not 
only unattainable, but may even be undesirable as societies may forego promising 
technologies that could address specific productivity constraints, particularly in 
developing countries. Thus, the need arises to establish regulatory systems that are 
commensurate to the potential risk of the technology, that are flexible enough to adapt to 
gains in knowledge and experience, that are transparent and fair, and that take into 
consideration all aspects of a broad and inclusive decision making process. Biosafety thus 
becomes a process that considers all costs, benefits and risks of prospective technologies, 
within the scope of overall sustainable agricultural and economic development. The 
biosafety process itself needs to have a “golden standard” of best practices in terms of 
data requirements, evaluation methodologies and analysis, but with a clear safety 
standard that needs to be met, complete understanding of how to judge how much data is sufficient and/or necessary to make a decision, to be carried out in a time delimited and 
predictable process. We believe that this set of characteristics, along with those included 
in Jaffe’s 2006 paper, defines a functional and pragmatic biosafety system.  Footnotes 
1 The main concern is for the potential of large (and in some cases excessive or unneeded) investments in 
biosafety assessments may stifle innovation, in some cases, making valuable GM technologies unavailable 
for commercialization. In this situation, cost of compliance with biosafety regulations may become an entry 
barrier to biotechnology products particularly for the public sector and small private firms (Falck-Zepeda, 
et. al 2003). While regulations may be a necessary condition for the assessment of biosafety, excessive and 
overly stringent conditions increase the cost of the technology relative to the benefit received from an 
incremental level of safety. The high cost of regulation may thus become a disincentive to the adoption by 
farmers (particularly poor small-holder) if it has an effect on prices for the new product. 
2  We collected data on the cost of development of viral resistant citrus at Udayana University, however the 
lead scientist indicated that the research team will not pursue the technology any further as they do not have 
the financial resources to comply with biosafety regulations. They rather opted pursuing other non-
regulated approaches to attending the productivity constraint.  
3 KPMG describes its approach succinctly as “The methodology used to develop a costing system for the 
Office of Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR) is based on the requirements of sound cost accounting 
practice as embodied in such tomes as the standard Horngren, Foster & Datar - Cost Accounting - a 
managerial emphasis…” 
4 The separation into stages is blurry, as a particular activity make accomplish both an R&D and a 
regulatory objective. We do not press too much this issue, rather we use these stages as an expository tool 
to  describe the innovation pocess. 
5 One can always argue that for environmental safety the minimum standard is the Cartagena Protocol itself 
and its member deliberations. In contrast, Codex Alimentarius may become such standard for food/feed 
safety. The only limitation of these two documents is that they are not sufficiently detailed to identify a 
minimum biosafety set or have not been finalized yet. This information may have to be gleaned from 
international efforts done by scientists, or may have to be done at the national level.  
6 Such as like the PSB Rc82 and Mabango 1 at PhilRice and IR64 and IR36. 
7 If bioavailability of Golden Rice or any other nutritionally enhanced product were to be required in the 
Philippines (or elsewhere) as part of the regulatory process, we consulted with the Food and Nutrition 
Research Institute of the Department of Science and Technology of The Philippines to obtain an estimate of 
the cost of conducting a bioavailability test on this particular technology. The Institute indicated to us that it 
has the capability to undertake the bioavailability study for 1.3 million pesos (approximately US $26,000). 
However, this may be a significant underestimate as the range of variation of these tests in other countries 
is from XXXX to YYYY US$. Note that if bioavailability and for toxicity/allergenicity were to be included 
in our estimates, the cost for these two tests would have accounted for almost one–third of the regulatory 
cost at this stage. References 
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 Tables  
 




Crop  Country  Event approved in 
Developed Countries 
Estimated Costs of 
Biosafety Regulations 
(US$) 
Food Crop  Maize  India  Yes  500,000 - 1,500,000 
 Maize  Kenya  Yes  980,000 
 Rice  India  No  1,500,000-  2,000,000 
 Rice  Costa 
Rica 
No 2,800,00 
 Beans  Brazil  No  700,000 
  Mustard  India  No & have to seek 
approval in export 
markets 
4,000,000 
 Soybeans  Brazil  Yes  4,000,000 
 Potatoes  South 
Africa 
Yes 980,000 
 Potatoes  Brazil    980,000 
 Papaya  Brazil  Yes   
Non-Food 
Crop 
Cotton  India  Yes  500,000 - 1,000,000 
 
 
Jute  India  No  1,000,000 - 1,500,000 
Note: Compilation presented in Falck Zepeda (2006) based on estimates from 
Quemada(2004), Odhiambo(2003), Sampaio(2002), Sittenfeld(2002). India data from a 
study by Pray, Bengali and Ramaswamy (2004). Table 2. Estimated Costs per Biosafety Activities for U.S., India and China 







Molecular characterization  300,000 – 1,200,000     
Toxicology (90 day rat trial)  250,000 – 300,000    14,500 
Allergenicity (Brown Norwegian rat 
study) 
 150,000   
Animal performance and safety 
studies 
300,000 – 840,000     
Poultry feeding study      5,000   
Goat feeding study – 90 
days 
 55,000   
Cow feeding study    10,000   
Fish feeding study    5,000   
Anti-nutrient    1,200 
Gene flow    40,000  11,200 
Impact on non-target organisms      11,600 
Baseline and follow-up resistance 
studies (ea.) 
 20,000   
Protein production/characterization  160,000 – 1,700,000     
Protein safety assessment  190,000 – 850,000     
Non-target organism studies  100,000 – 600,000     
ELISA development, validation, 
and expression 
400,000 – 600,000     
Composition assessment  750,000 – 1,500,000     
Agronomic and phenotypic 
assessment 
130,000 – 460,000   30,000 – 
205,000 
 
Socio-economic studies    15,000 - 
30,000 
 
Facility/management overhead costs  600,000 – 4,500,000     
Total Cost Approval    195,000   
Note: Source of USA estimates is Kalatzaidonakes, Alston and Bradford (2005); India 
estimates from Pray, Ramaswamy, and Bengali (2004).China from Pray et al. (2006).  
 Table 3. Actual and Present Value of R&D Activities to construct a GM technology in Indonesia  
     1,000s  IDR 1,000s  US$  










Collaborative Agreements  and Strategic 







1994-2004  1,481,887  2,470,043  317.6  650.9  Experiments were conducted at Plant Research 
International (PRI), Wageningen University, 






Department of Plant 




1997-2004  3,108,406  5,572,552  370.2  641.4  Parts of R&D done at Nagoya University 
(Japan). Research funded by a grant from JSPS 
(Japan). Collaborating institutions include 
Brawijaya University (Indonesia), Gajah Mada 
University (Indonesia) and Bioscience Center, 




PTPN XI Perseroan 
Terbatas Perkebunan 
Negara - Government 
Enterprise for Estate 
Crops 
1999-2002  1,380,359  2,272,024  154.8  255.1  Private company Ajinomoto sponsored R&D by 
donating equipments and chemicals valued at 




RCB-IIS / LIPI  1996-2002  2,925,009  7,149,026  522.5  1,466  The research were funded by the Rockefeller in 
the first 5 years besides funded by Indonesian 
government Indonesian Institute for Rice 








Monsanto n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  Gene technology developed in the U.S. 
Notes: n.a. = not available/applicable, Present Value (PV) for 2005 with interest rate of 18%, The GM citrus resistant to CPVD 





Table 4. Actual and Present Value of R&D Activities to construct a GM technology in The Philippines 
     1,000s  Pesos 1,000s  US$  
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          University of Queensland in Brisbane, 
Department of Science and 
Technology-Philippines, Australian 
Centre for International Agricultural 
Research (ACIAR), Philippine Council 
for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural 
Resources Research and Development 
(PCARRD). 
Golden rice  IRRI  1999-
2002& 
Beyond 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  Golden Rice Network, Syngenta, ETH-
Zurich, University of Freiburg 













-  85,655  -  1,384  Technology developed mostly in the 
U.S. , transferred to The Philippines 
Note: n.a.=not available/applicable. 
1 Cost included here are the development costs in the Philippines and an allocation of 
R&D activities done in the US through the use of the Lindahl factor charged to the Philippines.   
 Table 5.  Cost of Compliance with Biosafety Regulations of Drought Tolerant GM 
Sugarcane in Indonesia 











PV (US $) 
2003  Dossier filling for risk assessment   4 7,8  470 905
2003  Containment facility Test at 
ICABIOGRAD 
8 13,1 933 1,534
2003  Gene stability and plant phenotype 
at PTPN XI’ green-house 
50 69,6 5,834 8,123
2004  Confined Field trials (plant 
phenotype, drought tolerance, 
sugar content etc) in East Java  
58 68,4 6,455 7,617
2005  Confined Field trials (plant 
phenotype, drought tolerance, 
sugar content etc) in East Java  
58 58,0 5,961 5,961
 TOTAL  EXPENDITURES 
(COST) 
178 216,9 19,.649 24,139
    
  Estimated future expenses :   
? Gene-flow   
? Non-target  species   
? Food  safety   
? Feed  safety   
? Data  evaluation   
 Total   
Note: IDR= Indonesia Rupiah, ? =activities not done, expected in the near future.  Table 6.  Cost of Compliance with Biosafety Regulation of GM Rice Insect Resistant 
(Stemborers) Rice in Indonesia     













( US $) 
2001-
2002 
Dossier filling for risk 
assessment 
6 9.8  650  1,060 
2003-
2005 
Non target impact (insects and 
others) 
130 166.1  14,790  18,940 
2003-
2005 
Non target impact – soil 
microorganisms 
900 90.0  9,250  9,250 
 TOTAL  EXPENDITURES 
(COST) 
266 266.0  24,250  29,250 
         
  Estimated future expenses :         
? Gene-flow  50  42.4  5,140 4,350 
?  Multi location trials   400  287  41,110  29,520 
?  Non-target impacts   10  8.5  1,030  870 
? Gene-flow  10  722  1,030 740 
 Total  696  611  73,000  64,730 
Notes= 1) ?= estimated cost as the activity has not yet been done. 
 
Table 7. Cost of Compliance with Biosafety Regulations of GM Insect Resistant 








PV Total  
Cost 
Year Activity 
(million IDR) (US  $) 
Dossier for risk assessment  10.0  16.4  1,010  1,660  1998 
Morphological characteristic 
(containment facility at 
ICABIOGRAD) 
16.0 26.3  1,620 2,660 
1999  Confined Field Trials  30.0  41.8  3,840  5,350 
Multi-location trials  140.0  165.2  16,400  19,360  2000 
Technical Team meeting fee  10.0  11.8  1,170  1,380 
EIA(environment Impact 
Assessment)-Gene Flow 
125.0 125.0  12,180 12,180 
EIA-Non target impact  193.0  193.0  18,800  18,800 
2001 
EIA-soil microbes  395.0  395.0  38,480  38,480 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES (COST)  919.0  974.5  93,500  99,870 
Notes: EIA=Environmental Impact Assessments, Present Value (PV) for 2005, with interest rate 
of 18%. Table 8.  Cost of Compliance with Biosafety Regulations for Herbicide Resistant 















(million IDR)  (US $) 
2002  Dossier for risk assessment  10.0  16.4  1,080  1,770 
Morphological characteristic             
1.  Non target impact, invasiveness in 
contained facilities 




2.  Limited trial at 3 locations  30.0  49.3  3,240  5,320 
2002  Dossier for food safety  10.0  16.4  1,080  1,770 
2002 technical  meeting  (twice)  15.0  24.6  1,620  2,660 
 TOTAL  EXPENDITURES  (COST)  81.0  133.1  8,750  14,370 
        
  Estimated future expenses :         
? 1.  Multi-location trials (10 units, 2 
seasons, app 9 million) 
180.0 180.0  18,530  18,530 
? 2.  Variety released Team meeting to 
evaluate multi-location trials data 
15.0   15.0    1,540   1,540  
3.  Confined  Field  Trials      
a. EIA-Gene Flow  125.0  125.0  12,870  12,870 




c. EIA-soil microbes  395.0  395.0  40,660  40,660 
? 4.  Feed safety studies (fish, poultry)  15.0  15.0  1,540  1,540 
? 5.  Additional Technical meeting (3 
times) 
30.0 30.0  3,090  3,090 
TOTAL 1,034  1,086  106,850  112,480 
Notes: Present Value (PV) for 2005 with interest rate of 18%, ?= not yet determined 
 
 Table 9. Cost of Compliance with Biosafety Regulations for the Golden Rice in the 
Philippines 
Year  Activity  Actual Total Cost 
(US $) 
PV Total Cost 
(US$) 
2004  Application Lab/ Screen house  109  84 
2004- Lab  Tests  7,628  5,877 
idem  Screen house evaluation  23117  17810 
idem  Application confined field trials  115  83 
idem Lab.  Tests  1,201  936.03 
2005-
2006 
Confined Field trial (2 seasons)  3,063  2,753 
idem Toxicity  tests  36,938  32,329 
 TOTAL  EXPENDITURES  (COST) 66,253  55,312 
      
  Estimated future costs     
?  Application Multi Location trials  3,011  2181 
? Multi-loc  trials  28,774  20,836 
?  Bureau Plant Industry Monitoring  10,397  7,529 
? Application  commercialization  3,476  2,517 
?  Post  commercialization monitoring  22,544  16,324 
TOTAL   134,456  104,698 
Note: PV is in 2000 prices. Source of basic data: IRRI, Philrice, NCBP, BPI Table 10. Cost of Compliance with Biosafety Regulations Bacterial Leaf Blight 
Resistant Rice (Xa21) in the Philippines 
Year  Activity  Actual Total Cost 
(US $) 
PV Total Cost 
(US$) 
1998 Application  Lab/  Screenhouse  138  144 
1998-
1999 
Lab tests  14,473  15,045 
1998-
1999 
Screen house evaluation  3,181  3,307 
2001 Application  field  trials  100  88 
2002-
2003 
Lab tests  2,313  1,992 
2002- 
2003 
Field trials (2 seasons)  5,907  5,162 
? Application  multi-loc  trials  1,285  931 
? Multi-loc  trials  28,774  20,836 
? BPI  Monitoring  10,397  7,529 
? Risk  Assessment  1,726  1,250 
? Application  commercialization  1,749  1,267 
?  Risk assessment commercialization  1,726  1,250 
? Application  post-commercialization  1,749  1,267 
? Field  monitoring  54,059  39,145 
 TOTAL  127,577  99,213 
Note: PV is in 2000 prices. Source of basic data: IRRI, Philrice, NCBP, Bureau of Plant 
Industry-Philippines, PhilRice will not pursue this GM technology as there is a similar 
resistance pathway using conventional means. This is the best estimate from scientist and 
regulators assuming that the technology would have moved forward. Table 11. Cost of Compliance with Biosafety Regulations for Insect Resistant (Bt- 
MON810) Maize in the Philippines 












1980s  U.S. lab/greenhouse studies  95,274,121    696,075   5,120,244   37,409  
1990s  U.S. lab/greenhouse studies   
616,431,753 
4,503,666   23,904,819   174,649  
1997  Lab/Greenhouse  922,638   922,638   31,307   31,307  
1998  Lab/Greenhouse  1,065,476   1,065,476   26,055   26,055  
1999  Confined field trial  3,762,657   3,762,657   96,259   96,259  
2000  Confined field trial  3,246,431   3,246,431   73,459   73,459  
2000  Multi-location field trial   7,392,247    7,392,247   167,269   167,269  
2001  Multi-location field trial  16,120,342   16,120,342   316,131   316,131  
2002  Multi-location field trial   20,866,539    20,866,539  404,375   404,375  
2002   Commercial propagation - 
RP Studies 
13,793,309   13,793,309    267,302    267,302  
2002 Commercial  propagation  –
socioeconomic studies 
 2,204,703    2,204,703   42,725   42,725  
2002  Public information survey  26,975   26,975   523   523  
2002  Application fee commercial 
propagation 
287,474   287,474   5,304   5,304  
2003  Post commercialization   14,052,274   14,052,274   259,253   259,253  
2004  Post commercialization  11,265,589   11,265,589    201,028    201,028  
2003 Post  commercialization 
promotional materials  
15,203,283   15,203,283   280,488   280,488  
2004 Post  commercialization 
promotional materials 
12,567,490   12,567,490    224,260    224,260  
  Total  834,483,302  127,977,169  31,420,798   2,607,793  
Note: Lindahl factor was 0.00731 for Lab and greenhouse work done in the U.S., 
Expanded version of this table appears in Manalo and Ramon (2007)  
 
 










Laboratory 1997-2001  21,069,997.60  520,216.92  52.7 
Greenhouse 2001-2005  8,930,583.76  168,831.21  22.3 
Field Test  2006-2008  6,457,078.14  116,883.34  16.2 
Pre/Commercial 
Application 
2006-2008 3,506,506.39  63,501.03  8.8 
Total 1997-2008  39,964,165.90  869,432.50  100.0 
Note: Ph.P=Philippines Pesos Annex. Status of Biosafety Assessments and Systems in Indonesia and the 
Philippines 
Both Indonesia and The Philippines have recently approved new biosafety laws 
that update or replace older legislation. The new biosafety law in both countries was 
drafted with the stated intent in both countries’ regulatory systems to become fully 
compliant with the Cartagena Protocol. Formal approval and public release of the new 
laws in both countries coincided with the implementation of our data collection. As the 
regulatory system needs a long period of time to draft guidelines, standard operating 
procedures and other documents that govern implementation of the new law, therefore 
the data on the cost of compliance with biosafety regulations presented in this paper are 
based on the older laws, regulations and guidelines. The expectation in both countries is 
that the process under their new law is likely to have additional activities and/or 
potentially expand the focus of existing ones. This development may increase the 
regulatory lag and the overall cost of compliance with biosafety regulations, even as a 
change induced by the time cost of money invested due to the expanded regulatory lag. 
Indonesia biosafety regulations 
The first Indonesia biosafety regulation of GMO (Ministerial Decree No. 85 
Kpts/hk.330/9/1997) was released in 1997 by the Ministry of Agriculture. To implement 
the decree, the government created the Biosafety - Food Safety Commission whose 
function is to Government on the safe release of agricultural biotechnology product 
considering human health and/or environment. The Biosafety - Food Safety Commission 
was supported by a Technical Team consisting of experts in the plant biotechnology representing different national institutes and universities. The technical team formulated a 
series of guidelines for the release of genetically-engineered organism. These include 
general and specific guidelines for genetically engineered plants, microbes and animals.  
The 1997 decree was later revised in in 1999 by a Joint Decree drafted by four 
Ministries (Joint Decree SKB4M):  the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, 
the Ministry of Forestry and Estate, and the State Ministry of Food and Horticulture 
(Herman, 1999). Joint Decree SK4BM was later revised to comply with the Cartagena 
Protocol that had been ratified by Indonesia in 2004 through Law no. 21/2004. The new 
revision of this decree was in a law format signed by the President, not by the Ministries. 
This is Law no. 21/2005 which was released in May 2005. However, the guidelines and 
other implementing documents for this regulation has not been finished yet. Until this 
process is completed, Indonesia continues to use law SKB4M to evaluate and assess the 
biosafety and food safety of GMOs.   
Interesting to note that several applications for risk assessment of GM plants have 
been evaluated by the technical team, some of them have been determined to be 
environmentally safe. Some of the technologies reviewed by the regulatory system came 
from multi-national companies such as Monsanto, Dupont, and from national research 
institutes. Most of the technologies from national research institutes entered the 
regulatory process mostly to obtain approvals for research purposes (i.e. permits for 
conducting research). The research performed would allow building knowledge of gene 
function either in greenhouse or under confine field trials. Worthwhile noting that for 
most proponents the decision has not been made whether they will go for the commercialization, even while submitting an application for research purposes. This 
decision typically will be based on initial research results.
viii 
Philippines biosafety regulations 
Two government institutions are mandated to carry out the biosafety system 
outlined above: the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) and the 
Philippine Department of Agriculture (DA). At present, the NCBP is concerned with 
contained use (confined laboratory and greenhouse experiments on the regulated article) 
while the DA is with the field release and commercialization. 
Executive Order No. 430 (EO430), issued by the President of the Philippines in 
October 15, 1990, created the NCBP and identified the scope of its functions. On the 
other hand, the DA supplemented the Plant Quarantine Act of 1978 by issuing 
Administrative Order No. 8 (AO8) on April 2002 to regulate plants and plant products 
derived from the use of modern biotechnology. These two policies provide the structure 
of the Philippine biosafety system. 
The NCBP constitutes the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines. 
The primary function of the Committee is to identify and evaluate potential hazards 
involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments and recommend measures to 
minimize risks. The NCBP is a multi agency regulatory body which drafted the Biosafety 
Guidelines in 1990 (later revised in 1998), requiring the creation of Institutional 
Biosafety Committees (IBC). Through this process, preliminary biosafety and risk 
evaluation is done at the IBC level. If the IBC deems that associated risks, if any, are 
minimal or can be mitigated, it endorses the project proposal to the NCBP Secretariat Upon receipt of the proposal from the NCBP Secretariat, the NCBP appoints at least 
three experts, collectively called the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), from 
its roster of independent scientists to evaluate potential adverse effects of the project to 
human health and environment. Concurrent with the review by the STRP are public 
notifications of the proposal and solicitation of comments. 
 
Footnotes 
viii This is a major difference between the public and private sectors in terms of how they structure their 
research processes. The private sector will typically try to identify as early as possible those technologies 
that will indeed go to commercialization and have (somewhat) well defined plans for technology transfer. 
This behavior is a partial result of the added cost and complexity of biosafety processes required for 
commercialization. The public sector may even reach pre-commercialization stages without a clear plan for 
technology transfer (Atanassov, et al. 2003). 